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1 INTRODUCTION 
A multi-faceted debate: the role of patents in the global economy 
Until relatively recently the notion that patents promote the inventive process, 
innovation and development remained largely uncontested. Policy making in the 
field of patents focused almost entirely on ensuring that patent regimes 
provided strong protection for rights-holders, with the presumption that benefits 
would then accrue for developed, developing and least-developed countries.1 
For the global economy these benefits would include increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and higher levels of technology transfer or licensing leading to 
the transfer of know-how and expertise that would contribute to local economic 
growth and higher levels of domestic innovation (Matthews 2002: 108). 
The economic rationale for these anticipated benefits was that, by preventing 
competitors from imitating an invention, a free-rider problem could be avoided 
whereby a new entrant imitated (i.e. copied) the technology and the inventor 
could not then generate sufficient returns on their investment to cover costs 
associated with the inventive process. The concern was that, even if the social 
benefits of free-riding were significant, the potential innovator without patent 
protection could well decide subsequently against innovating altogether or could 
under-invest in the future (Bessen and Maskin 1999: 2; Mukherjee and 
Pennings 2004: 715). 
Following implementation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) it has more recently 
become widely recognised that, while patents can stimulate the inventive 
process by avoiding the free-rider problem, promoting investment in research 
and development (R&D) and encouraging diffusion of knowledge, patents can 
also hinder development if a balance between rewarding inventors and 
safeguarding the public domain for a wider public good is not achieved. 
                                            
1
 Although there is no established definition of what constitutes a developing country, the 
following are defined as least-developed countries by the United Nations: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People‟s Democratic 
Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Lesté, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia. 
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While developed countries have well-established and longstanding patent 
regimes, designed to encourage inventive activity and promote investment 
R&D, many low income developing and least-developed countries are unable to 
realise the prices for goods derived from patented inventions to the same extent 
as can be done in the developed world. There is therefore a trade-off that needs 
to be made between the impact of weaker patent regimes and the potential for 
increased technological diffusion in recipient developing and least-developed 
countries if foreign partners are more willing to undertake FDI and enter into 
licensing agreements in the knowledge that stronger patent protection is 
available (World Bank 2008). 
This debate about the role of patents in the global economy has become part of 
a much wider discourse on global justice and equity, trade rules and economic 
development strategies, and the negative consequences of an unbalanced 
patent regime. 
Yet, although theoretical studies (Lai 1998; Taylor 1994) have stressed the 
importance of patents for technological diffusion through FDI and licensing 
agreements, empirical evidence is ambiguous overall (World Bank 2008). Some 
studies find no relationship between the level of patent protection and FDI or 
licensing (Primo Braga and Fink 2000; Branstetter, Fisman and Foley 2005; 
Maskus and Konan 1994) while other studies show a positive effect of strong 
patent regimes on FDI both in influencing location decisions by multilateral 
corporations and in inducing foreign firms to invest in production rather than in 
distribution activities (Javorcik 2004; Lee and Mansfield 1996; Mansfield 1994; 
Maskus 1998). 
In addition, while some evidence suggests that a stronger patent regime is 
associated with a rise in flows of knowledge and FDI into middle-income and 
large developing countries (World Bank 2008), this is not the case with poorer 
and lower income or least-developed nations (Fink 2005; Hoekman, Maskus 
and Saggi 2005; Smith 2001). 
So it is in the context of this wider debate about the role of patents in the global 
economy that this chapter examines in greater detail the following issues: (i) 
whether patents can be used as a stimulus for invention and innovation; (ii) the 
role of patents in recently industrialised countries; (iii) the impact of patents on 
development; (iv) the role of licensing and technology transfer; (v) the impact of 
the TRIPS Agreement; (vi) public health issues: given that concerns about the 
appropriateness of the present patent system have focused, in particular, on 
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health and access to medicines in developing countries, alternatives to the 
present patent system will then be considered in relation to current initiatives to 
address public health imperatives; and (vii) prospects for the future, particularly 
in terms of the potential of using patent information to stimulate invention and 
innovation. 
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2 PATENTS AS A STIMULUS FOR INVENTION AND 
INNOVATION 
It is often said that patents stimulate invention and innovation. The distinction 
between the two concepts is key to understanding why this might be the case. 
While the invention of new things can be protected by patents, innovation refers 
to the development of marketable products from that invention. Innovation can 
be protected only indirectly through whatever patent protection the related 
invention is able to obtain and the extent of protection granted therefore 
depends on the invention-innovation link. In the case of pharmaceutical 
inventions, for instance, what is worked on in the laboratory, described in the 
patent specification, manufactured and ultimately prescribed by the medical 
practitioner and administered to the patient, are all absolutely identical. In 
contrast, in the case of engineering, the actual link between a patented 
invention and the related innovation process is nothing like as close as there will 
almost certainly be a number of incremental changes between the start of 
development work on such an invention and the time a product is finally put on 
the market (Fink and Maskus 2005). 
The recent record of countries in nurturing a culture of invention and innovation 
carries mixed messages for developing and least-developed nations seeking to 
progress along a path of economic development. Inadequate patent protection 
can stifle both the invention and innovation process even in countries with low 
levels of economic development (Maskus 2000a: 299). This is because, since 
pioneering inventive breakthroughs are extremely rare, in the vast majority of 
cases invention is a relatively mundane process involving minor adaptations to 
existing technologies, with cumulatively powerful effects on growth. As such, it 
is important for firms to adopt new management and organisational systems 
and new product and quality control mechanisms to identify new technologies. 
This is difficult in an environment of weak patent protection as it is not always 
possible to foster attitudes of creativity, invention and risk-taking in such an 
environment, a culture of imitation leading instead to economic stagnation 
(Maskus 2000a: 299). 
There is no single iconic, fail-safe way of achieving successful catch-up with 
developed country economies that every country can or should emulate 
(Fagerberg 2006: 17). Instead, every country needs to develop its own 
approach based on an understanding of: firstly, the contemporary global 
technological, institutional and economic dynamics; secondly, the behaviour 
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and needs of the relevant agents (of which the firm is arguably the most 
important); and, thirdly, the specific context in which the catch-up takes place 
and the broader factors that influence it. 
Fink and Maskus (2005: 5) have also pointed out that developing and least-
developed countries differ from their industrial counterparts in their innovative 
potential, the education of their workforce, the structure and funding of research 
and development (R&D), the management of technological assets, and the 
existence of complementary intellectual property institutions, such as 
technology transfer offices (TTOs). 
Defining innovation is also extremely difficult in the context of a developing or 
least-developed country. The innovative process in these types of country can 
involve many forms of adaptation, absorption and even creative imitation 
(Maskus 2000a: 325). But, while the poorest countries allocate virtually no 
resources to invention or innovation and have little intellectual property to 
protect, as incomes and technical capabilities grow to moderate levels, some 
inventive capacity emerges, particularly of the adaptive kind, incorporating 
modifications into existing technologies. The primary economic activity at this 
stage of development is still likely to be based on imitation (not innovation) and 
the majority of economic and political actors will consequently prefer weak 
patent protection in order to facilitate this. As an economy develops further, 
additional inventive capacity and demands for high-quality products begin to 
emerge. At this stage, more domestic firms begin to see the benefits of effective 
patent protection, as do foreign firms interested in servicing growing markets. 
Finally, demand for patent protection increases sharply as incomes reach the 
higher levels found in developed countries (Maskus 2000a: 298). 
Alongside demand for patent protection through increased patent filing activity, 
the strength of enforcement efforts also differ as economic development occurs. 
On the part of low-income developing and least-developed countries, this may 
involve costly administrative expenses and the necessity to train human capital 
in the complex technical and judicial issues associated with patent protection 
and enforcement that have not previously been encountered at the domestic 
level (Maskus 2000a: 298). 
In fact, developed and developing countries respond differently to reforms 
related to patent protection and enforcement. Park (2008: 322-3), for instance, 
argues that patent protection and enforcement in developing countries need to 
reach a threshold level before R&D becomes responsive to reforms of the 
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patent system. Similarly Allred and Park (2007) find that, although a relationship 
between patent strength and R&D can be identified in developed countries, this 
is not so evident in developing nations. 
For some developing or least-developed countries shifting from initially weaker 
patent regimes and introducing stronger patent protection, levels of R&D may 
actually decrease. This can occur because these types of economies, with 
weaker patent regimes, are largely conducting incremental, adaptive innovation. 
In such circumstances the increased costs of R&D associated with the 
introduction of higher levels of patent protection may bring about a greater 
detrimental effect in the short-term, instead of a positive impact brought about 
by enhanced opportunities for investment in R&D in a stronger patent 
environment (Park 2008: 312). As a result, Allred and Park conclude that patent 
protection has a statistically insignificant effect on R&D, Park (2005) also finding 
that patent protection has largely negligible impacts on developing country R&D 
expenditures. 
In part, this is because a larger market for patented products or a larger R&D 
sector is required before stronger patent protection provides sufficient 
incentives for increasing R&D expenditures. Strengthening patent regimes from 
an initially low level to a somewhat higher level may not therefore be sufficient 
to provide the necessary incentives or the wherewithal to provide a legal 
infrastructure to support research and innovation (such as research facilities, a 
court system, patent administration, specialised professions, or a market for 
licensed technologies (Park 2008: 312-3). 
Allred and Park (2007) even found that stronger patent protection can have a 
negative effect on domestic patenting activity in developing countries because 
patent reforms attract foreign patents which are filed first, have priority rights 
and which cover diverse fields and claims so that some domestic patenting in 
developing countries is crowded out, displaced or pre-empted by foreign 
patents. 
These transformative difficulties, as developing countries seek to move from 
imitation to innovation in a strong regime of patent protection and enforcement, 
can in part be addressed through effective systems of utility model protection 
which require lower levels of novelty than patents but grant more limited periods 
of protection. A study of Japan‟s system of utility model protection (Maskus and 
McDaniel 1999), for instance, demonstrated that this contributed positively and 
significantly to Japan‟s post-war productivity increases. The study‟s findings 
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indicate that patents play a positive role in stimulating enterprise development 
and innovation in developing countries. At the same time, they also make clear 
that a reformed legal regime is likely to be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for local technology development. 
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3 THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN RECENTLY 
INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES 
So, on one hand it is argued that patent rights promote innovation because the 
patent system allows for returns on the inventive process. On the other hand, 
concerns have been raised that the patent system increases the costs of 
innovation and technology transfer because technological inputs will be more 
expensive when protected by proprietary rights (Park 2008: 297). 
Moreover, while the primary objective of a stronger system of patent protection 
and enforcement is to maximise the competitive gains from additional 
innovation and technology acquisition over time, with particular emphasis on 
raising innovative activity by domestic entrepreneurs and enterprises, upgrading 
patent protection alone is an insufficient condition to achieve this. Instead, the 
patent system needs to be strengthened within a comprehensive and coherent 
set of policy initiatives that optimise the effectiveness of patents. Such initiatives 
include: further structural reform of enterprises; trade and investment 
liberalisation; promotion of financial and innovation systems to commercialise 
new technologies; expansion of educational opportunities to build human capital 
for absorbing and developing technology; and specification rules for maintaining 
effective competition in developing country markets (Maskus, Dougherty and 
Mertha 2005: 297). 
As noted earlier, innovation in developing countries tends to be more imitative, 
adaptive and incremental in nature than in developed nations, with recent 
empirical work by Park (2008) demonstrating that different environments and 
innovative capacities mean that the optimal level and impact of patents varies 
depending on the stage of economic development domestically (Park 2008: 
297). This leads to concerns that, if developing countries were obliged to adopt 
developed country standards of patent protection, the resulting standards would 
exceed optimal levels for their economies. Instead, Park (2008: 298) has 
suggested that developing country patent regimes should take into account 
market size and the imitative, adaptive nature of developing country R&D. If 
standards of patent protection are too high in developing countries, Park 
argues, there is a risk that innovation could be adversely affected. 
Conventional thinking is that the imitation phase is an essential first step of 
development whereby domestic firms can internalise the „global‟ state of the art 
in any given field – in other words, before one can innovate, one must know 
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what the most advanced thinking is around the world. After that, developing 
country firms can engage in low-level innovation in terms of developing 
incremental improvements to pioneering technologies and obtain patent 
protection on these incremental changes to known technologies. Of course, in 
order to do so, developing country innovators must have the necessary 
intellectual, technical and material tools to access and process this global state 
of the art before improvements or adaptations can be envisaged. For Gervais 
(2007: 43) this explains the strong emphasis on education in technical 
assistance analyses. 
However, recent developments in China, India and other countries such as 
Brazil and Russia beg the question whether imitation is a necessary phase of 
industrial development.2 For fast growing developing countries, particularly 
Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) inward technology transfer remains the 
primary source of new information for effecting technological change and 
structural transformation (Fink and Maskus 2005: 6). 
In practice, the innovation pattern varies between industry sectors and does not 
accord with the conventional thinking that the imitation phase is an essential 
first step in every case. In an industry where imitation is challenging and costly, 
the innovation sequences may well not include imitation. By way of illustration, 
the aerospace industry is a common example of a sector where patents are 
relatively unimportant. In this respect, it is important to differentiate between 
industries when considering the impact of the patent system on invention and 
innovation.  
A related question is whether technological innovation can be woven into 
different social and economic fabrics or whether, conversely, Western economic 
institutions and capitalism are a prerequisite for that patent system driving 
invention and innovation. In this respect, Gervais (2007: 43) notes that China 
appears to have done better over the past ten years than, for instance, India, 
while being further removed from the free market economy approach of the 
developed world. 
Maskus (2000a: 300) reports that higher standards of patent protection and 
enforcement stimulate innovation in developing countries, citing evidence that 
was presented in the results of a survey of 377 Brazilian firms, conducted jointly 
by the Brazilian Ministry of Industrial Development and Commerce and the 
                                            
2
 Defined as a movement towards Western-style capitalism with a strong emphasis on 
innovation. 
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American Chamber of Commerce. The survey found that 80 per cent of firms in 
the cohort would invest more in internal R&D and training if better patent 
protection were available. 
In China, while the regime for patent protection appears to have been improving 
in recent years, there are still significant problems associated with inadequate 
enforcement of those rights. Regional income differences, insufficient incentives 
for commercialisation of the results of R&D and relatively low levels of research 
effort are also significant factors that could hinder the likely impact of the patent 
system in that country (Maskus 2000a: 308). 
Nonetheless, the use of patents is rising rapidly in China for a number of 
reasons: firstly, the laws have improved and application fees are lower, inviting 
more applications; secondly, as patent infringement increases, both domestic 
and foreign enterprises recognise the importance of establishing a more 
rigorous patent enforcement regime; thirdly, as income levels grow, patents 
become more important in Chinese markets; and, fourthly, Chinese research 
organisations and enterprises are engaged in higher levels of invention, with 
Chinese firms also undertaking more innovative activity. 
However, although bringing new products to market is a critical issue for 
technology development in China, with research managers often facing 
inadequate incentives to convert the results of their inventive work into 
marketable products and services, there is a lack of clarity on who owns 
technologies. There are also insufficient links between state owned enterprises 
and distribution networks, and there is a capital market that does not sufficiently 
finance private risk-taking. 
Patents can play an important and constructive role in overcoming these 
difficulties by providing a well-defined asset, and participants in the research 
process can see clearly see the benefits of patent ownership (Maskus 2000a: 
323). Such rights generate incentives for commercialising patented 
technologies and make the risk-taking associated with invention and 
commercialisation more attractive to potential investors such as banks and 
venture capitalists. 
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4 THE IMPACT OF PATENTS ON DEVELOPMENT 
In practice the impact of patents on economic development is complicated by 
the fact that the potential gains in innovation must be offset against the short-
term costs associated with patent protection, particularly the likelihood that 
relatively high prices will be charged for patented products, such as 
pharmaceuticals, in the absence of imitative products circulating in the market 
(Maskus 2000a: 169). Furthermore, in reality the extent to which patents will 
contribute to innovation and economic development will depend on local 
conditions and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Recent studies 
have considered this question in econometric terms. 
Gould and Gruben (1996) related economic growth rates across countries to a 
simple index of patent strength and other variables. They found no strong direct 
effects of patents on growth but noted a significantly positive effect when the 
index was interacted with a measure of openness to trade. In particular they 
found that strengthening the patent regime in open economies was likely to 
raise growth rates by 0.6 per cent on average. For Gould and Gruben, 
therefore, trade liberalisation in combination with stronger patent protection and 
enforcement enhances growth because it improves the competitive nature of 
markets and increases access to foreign technologies. 
Park and Ginarte (1997) focused on the extent that patents affect investment in 
capital and R&D, as well as economic growth. As with Gould and Gruben‟s 
study, they found no direct correlation between patent strength and economic 
growth. However, Park and Ginarte did generate empirical evidence to suggest 
that patents can have a powerful and positive effect on investment and R&D 
spending, which in turn can have indirect positive effects on economic growth.  
For Maskus (2000a: 306) the empirical evidence thus supports three major 
conclusions. Firstly, while the relationship between patents and economic 
development is complex and difficult to unpack, on balance the evidence 
suggests that patents can indirectly have a positive effect on development.  
Secondly, the extent to which patents facilitate economic growth and technology 
development depends heavily on local conditions and the specific context in 
which the patent regime is operating. In this regard, policy-makers can 
maximise the benefits of the patent system  by promoting an active technology 
infrastructure, including building human capital and skills, developing an 
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innovation system that helps move technologies from laboratories to the market, 
and establishing a transparent set of patent policy instruments. 
Other important complementary factors include: structural reform to increase 
entrepreneurship and flexibility of enterprises; expanded liberalisation of 
restrictions on trade, investment and technology agreements; and additional 
steps to ensure competition in domestic markets among firms and across 
regions. Thirdly, there remains a role for restricting patents in order to achieve 
social goals such as ensuring access to affordable medicines and ensuring an 
adequate balance of benefits in technology transfer. Achieving social goals 
through restrictions on patents must, however, be achieved in a way that does 
not unduly limit the competitive incentives that are intended to be generated by 
the patent system as a whole (Maskus 2000a: 306). In this respect, a balanced 
patent system is defined as one where social benefits exceed social costs, and 
the system therefore contributes to a nation‟s economic wellbeing. Achieving 
balance in the system should therefore be the key objective of patent policy 
(Moir 2009). 
So patents are capable of encouraging innovation under certain conditions, but 
can also hinder innovation under others and, given the complexity of the 
relationship between patents, innovation and economic performance, fine-
tuning of the patent system is crucial to ensure that patents become an effective 
policy instrument for innovation (OECD 2004: 9). The risk is that patent 
protection may hinder innovation when it limits access to essential knowledge, 
as may be the case in emerging technological areas when innovation has a 
particularly pronounced cumulative character and patents protect foundational 
inventions. In this context, patent protection that is too broad can discourage 
follow-on inventors if the holder of a patent for an essential technology refuses 
others access under reasonable conditions (Merges and Nelson 1992: 187). 
Furthermore, although patents are invariably thought of as the characteristic 
means of making it rational to invest in innovation, in fact they rank in 
importance far behind large-scale investments in terms of their ability to 
stimulate and facilitate innovation. This assertion is supported by empirical 
evidence on how firms capture the rewards from the results of their R&D in the 
US, Europe and Japan. These studies are generally in agreement that, with the 
exception of the strong role played by patents in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries, patents are unambiguously the least central of the 
major mechanisms for facilitating innovation (Kingston 2009: 12). Nonetheless, 
in technologies where the time and cost of imitation are relatively low, such as 
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in pharmaceuticals, there is a risk that innovation would not take place in the 
absence of a strong patent regime (Moir 2009: 33). In such instances, the 
crucial role played by the patent system as a stimulus for innovation needs to 
be recognised (Moir 2009: 38). 
Yet the relationship between patents and innovation will still depend on the 
stage of economic development of the country in question and the initial 
strength of patent protection before stronger protection is introduced (Park 
2008: 296).  As we have seen, depending on the initial level of patent 
protection, the rate of innovation can vary significantly in response to higher 
standards of patent protection. 
Park (2008: 297) suggests that stronger patent rights may negatively effect 
innovation because stronger rights increase the incentives to file patent 
applications. As a result, if more patents are subsequently issued, more 
second-comer innovators will need to obtain more permissions in order to 
access and build on previous technologies. These so-called „patent thickets‟ 
increase the transaction costs of licensing and cross-licensing negotiations 
(Shapiro 2001). They also increase the likelihood of blocking patents, namely 
where the holder of a patent refuses to grant permissions in order to stave off 
competitive market entry. The increased transaction costs associated with 
blocking patents can consequently have a negative effect on R&D and 
innovation (Park 2008: 297). 
A further variable to take into account is the fact that innovation is not only 
about developing new products – it is also about establishing marketing and 
distribution networks that support expansion and scale economies. It is 
therefore widely thought that it is difficult to do this in an environment of weak 
patent protection because rights-holders cannot readily protect their marketing 
channels (Maskus 2000a: 301). 
For Maskus (2000a: 325) while higher standards of patent protection may make 
imitation more costly, real productivity benefits are likely to be realised through 
higher quality and increased levels of foreign technology inflows, either via 
technology transfer or FDI. These inflows, in turn, are critical to the success of 
domestic innovation efforts, with the key challenge being the identification of an 
appropriate patent regime that can attract foreign technology inflows at the 
same time as enhancing and protecting domestic incremental innovation. 
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Yet higher standards of patent protection do not in themselves establish the 
effective conditions under which technology development and growth will occur. 
Rather, these higher standards must be part of a broader toolkit of policy 
instruments that include an active technology innovation system, strengthened 
development in human capital through education in science and technology, 
and measures to encourage lifelong learning through training within enterprises, 
as well as through the formal education system (Maskus 2000a: 327). 
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5 LICENSING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Licensing can also be used as a valuable policy tool to substitute for FDI and to 
overcome uncertainty about the policy environment, and may be a more viable 
route for multinationals seeking to exploit their patented inventions than 
exploiting the technology through foreign investment. This may be even more 
likely to be the case since domestic firms may have more information or be 
better placed than foreigners to deal with a poor policy environment (World 
Bank 2008). Maskus (2002) suggests that both FDI and licensing respond to an 
adequate business environment, and factors such as patent protection may shift 
incentives for investors from FDI toward licensing. 
In practice, where patent protection is weak, multinationals may be less willing 
to license technology for fear of it being copied by domestic firms or, 
alternatively, they may only license out-of-date technologies (Maskus 2000b). 
Data on U.S. multinationals show that the likelihood of entering into licensing 
agreements increases as developing countries raise the standard of patent 
protection available (Antras, Desai and Foley 2007). 
Yet, for the poorest countries in particular, technology transfer to least-
developed countries has in recent years been hampered by factors including 
the fact that technology is mainly in the private sector, with a limited role from 
governments, and also because least-developed countries‟ absorptive capacity 
needs to be increased, with greater emphasis on education and training.  
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6 THE IMPACT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
Reconciling TRIPS implementation in developing and least-developed countries 
with national patent policies to promote invention and innovation is therefore a 
significant challenge.  Discussion has focused in part on utilising to the full 
extent measures to protect and promote the public interest as set out in 
flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS Agreement, such as Article 7 on technology 
transfer and dissemination, Article 8.1 on measures to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development or Article 29 on disclosure in patent applications. 
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement sets out the objectives that WTO member 
countries should be able to reach through the protection and enforcement of 
such rights.3 As Article 7 makes clear, intellectual property rights are not an end 
in themselves, so the protection of intellectual property rights will not 
automatically lead to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2005: 126). 
Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the opportunity for WTO member 
countries, when formulating or amending their laws and regulations, to promote 
the public interest, including those in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.4 Although „public interest‟ is not defined 
in the TRIPS Agreement, this suggests that measures adopted by WTO 
members should be presumed consistent with TRIPS unless another member 
seeking to challenge the exercise of discretion is able to prove inconsistency 
(UNCTAD-ICTSD 2005: 127). In this way, by mandating measures to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, Article 8.1 provides an important flexibility in limiting 
                                            
3
 Article 7, TRIPS Agreement: „The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of 
rights and obligations.‟ 
4
 Article 8.1, TRIPS Agreement: „Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.‟ 
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the potential range of non-violation nullification or impairment causes of action 
that might be pursued under TRIPS (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2005: 127).5 
The relationship between patents, health and access to medicines has been a 
critical issue with regard to the public interest in developing and least-developed 
countries in recent years, with many medicines that could save or extend lives 
unavailable, inaccessible, or unaffordable to those who need them most. There 
is a pressing need for measures to ensure access to existing medicines and the 
development of new medicines that effectively address the global disease 
burden. In the context of these concerns, the obligations of developing and 
least-developed countries to implement the TRIPS Agreement have come 
under close scrutiny, and criticism from development-orientated public health 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and public health experts has been 
commonplace. 
These criticisms have arisen because the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO 
members to grant patents for pharmaceutical products. Patented medicines 
generally cost more than the equivalent, unpatented, „generic‟ versions but the 
TRIPS Agreement limits the extent to which countries can produce, import and 
export cheaper generic versions of medicines. With the prospect of rising prices 
for patented medicines, the link between patents and access to medicines has 
become more widely recognised. 
In the immediate post-TRIPS period the initial challenge related to the scope 
and interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement - to the constraints on the use of in-
built TRIPS flexibilities designed to ensure access to medicines. TRIPS 
flexibilities include provisions with regard to compulsory licensing, exceptions to 
rights granted by patents and parallel importation. Under Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement a compulsory licence can be granted by a government to allow a 
third party to produce a generic version of a patented pharmaceutical product 
without the authorisation of the patent holder, in so doing allowing low-price 
generic pharmaceuticals to be produced locally (Matthews 2004: 77). The 
TRIPS Agreement provides a further public health-related flexibility with 
possible exceptions to rights conferred by a patent, including research and 
                                            
5
 On 6 November 2009 WTO members reached agreement on a two-year recommended 
extension of a moratorium on challenging other WTO members under intellectual property rules 
for actions not in violation of the WTO, according to a WTO official. The recommended 
extension would go before the WTO General Council and then to ministers at the 30 November 
to 2 December 2009 WTO ministerial in Geneva. 
 Section 6   |   THE IMPACT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
 
Patents in the Global Economy   |   Duncan Matthews   |   2010 Page 18 of 33 
 
 
experimentation, prior use, early working, and the export of medicines to non-
producing countries. 
Parallel trade refers to instances where products produced under protection of a 
patent (or trade mark or copyright) in one market are subsequently exported to 
a second market and placed on that market without the authorisation of the 
local owner of the patent, with the practical effect that a patented product 
becomes available locally from multiple sources, in doing so enhancing market 
competition between sources of the same products which tends to drive down 
prices (Matthews and Munoz-Tellez 2007: 1429). Under the TRIPS Agreement, 
countries are free to determine how they approach exhaustion of rights, with the 
effect that developing countries can adopt in their national regimes an 
international exhaustion principle to permit parallel importation which, under 
certain conditions, would allow for a patented medicine to be imported and sold 
in the market at a lower price than that for which the patent holder sells it in that 
market (Matthews and Munoz-Tellez 2007: 1429). 
However, developing countries have faced a number of problems in utilising 
available TRIPS flexibilities to protect public health and to promote access to 
medicines. One of the main problems for developing countries attempting to 
utilise TRIPS flexibilities is that, although the provisions on compulsory licensing 
permit generic drug companies to manufacture a patented product without the 
authorisation of the right holder, in doing so creating a mechanism for cheap 
generic medicines to be made available at a lower cost than the equivalent 
patented products, the TRIPS Agreement also requires that medicines 
produced under compulsory licence conditions should be predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market of the WTO member authorising such use. This 
constitutes a major problem for WTO members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector, these countries being 
unable to make effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS 
Agreement (Matthews 2004: 78). On 6 December 2005 an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement was agreed, making permanent a waiver of the requirement 
that compulsory licences be predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market (Matthews 2006). However, two principle problems persist in relation to 
patents, health and access to medicines: firstly, perceived restrictions on the 
use of TRIPS flexibilities due to bilateral trade pressures; and secondly the 
relative inability of the patent system to provide adequate incentives for R&D 
into neglected diseases. 
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The use of compulsory licensing provisions and other TRIPS flexibilities has 
been problematic because the procedural requirements for implementing the 
appropriate national legal provisions are complex and burdensome, particularly 
for developing and least-developed countries that lack the necessary technical 
and legal expertise and administrative capacity (Matthews 2005: 423).  In 
addition, free trade agreements (FTAs) often include measures, commonly 
referred to as „TRIPS-plus‟ provisions, that prevent developing countries from 
using TRIPS flexibilities and often even exceed the obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement and  limit the capacity of developing countries to issue compulsory 
licenses effectively or allow parallel importation (Musungu, Villanueva and 
Blasetti 2004: 30). 
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7 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT PATENT 
SYSTEM 
Given that concerns about the appropriateness of the present patent system 
have focused, in particular, on health and access to medicines in developing 
countries, it is in this context that alternatives to the present system have come 
to the fore with greatest prominence. 
Although fewer than 5 per cent of medicines on the WHO Model List of 
Essential Medicines are patented (World Health Organisation 2002: 4) many 
new drugs, particularly those designed to deal with the most pressing public 
health crisis of modern times, the HIV/AIDS virus, are subject to patent control 
(Bourgeois and Burns 2002: 839). Many commentators fear that the problem of 
obtaining access to the medicines needed to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
in developing countries will be further hindered by the patent provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement. The concern has been that, due to the TRIPS Agreement, 
the extension of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in developing and least-
developed countries will lead to unacceptably high prices for medicines in the 
developing world (see also Ismail 2003: 395; Rozek 2000: 896; Rozek and 
Rainey 2001: 471).  
This concern was affirmed in the UK Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights report, which suggested that if patents were absent in developing 
countries more patients would be able to afford treatment since there is 
considerable evidence that consumption of medicines is sensitive to price 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002: 37; see also Department for 
International Development 2003: 5; and criticisms of the CIPR Report by Crespi 
2003). But, conversely, in the absence of patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
in developing countries, the Commission‟s report also demonstrated that there 
may be insufficient incentive structures, with the result that investment in private 
sector pharmaceutical R&D for diseases that predominantly affect developing 
countries remains low. 
Less than 5 per cent of the estimated $44 billion spent on R&D is directed 
towards developing country diseases, while only 13 of the 1,393 new drugs 
approved between 1975 and 1999 are concerned with tropical diseases 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002: 32). The HIV/AIDS pandemic 
is particularly problematic in this respect since the majority of HIV vaccines are 
being developed for genetic profiles of subtype B, prevalent in developed 
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countries, while most AIDS sufferers in developing countries are types A and C, 
for which far less research is being carried out (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights 2002: 33). 
Yet the overall situation remains complex with factors other than patents (such 
as health care provision, research and political commitment in developing 
countries) also constituting significant barriers to access to essential medicines 
in developing countries. Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001), for instance, have 
argued that patents are not a significant barrier to the treatment of HIV/AIDS in 
Africa, with a variety of other factors, such as poverty, tariffs and sales taxes, 
and a lack of sufficient international financial aid to fund anti-retroviral treatment, 
being of greater significance. 
Since 2003 the World Health Organization (WHO) has been addressing the 
need to support biomedical R&D and released a report by the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) in April 2006. 
The subsequent WHO Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property was established in 2006 by WHA 
Resolution 59.24 and was tasked with producing a "global strategy and plan of 
action" with the goal of "securing an enhanced and sustainable basis for needs-
driven, essential health research and development relevant to diseases that 
disproportionately affect developing countries, proposing clear objectives and 
priorities for research and development, and estimating funding needs in this 
area." A Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property was adopted in May 2008 by WHA Resolution 61.21. In 
November 2008, a results-orientated and time-limited Expert Working Group 
(EWG) on R&D Financing was established.  
The EWG has the mandate to examine current financing and coordination of 
research and development, as well as proposals for new and innovative 
sources of funding to stimulate research and development related to Type II and 
Type III diseases and the specific R&D needs of developing countries in relation 
to Type I diseases. The EWG has a one-year mandate to examine current 
financing and coordination of research and development, as well as proposals 
for new and innovative sources of funding to stimulate research and 
development related to Type II and Type III diseases and the specific R&D 
needs of developing countries in relation to Type I diseases. The members of 
the group are 24 internationally recognized policy-makers and technical experts 
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that participate in their personal capacity. Amongst the proposals under review 
by the EWG are prize funds and patent pools. 
In addressing the need for a new global framework for supporting the funding of 
medical R&D, the EWG has considered the extent that prize funds can be used 
as mechanisms for stimulating R&D into diseases that disproportionately affect 
the developing world. Prizes are funds that create rewards for successful 
development of new products, to be paid in a lump sum once a product obtains 
the necessary marketing approval. The International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) has argued that 
prizes should be structured to complement and not undermine current patent 
systems.6 Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) has argued that innovation 
inducement prizes with proportional reward systems should replace marketing 
monopolies as the primary incentive mechanism for stimulating R&D.7 
Another initiative relates to the use of patent pools. A patent pool is an 
agreement between two or more patent owners to licence one or more of their 
patented inventions as a package (Kaplan 2007). This agreement can take 
many different forms (Serafino, 2007). In one common form, patents are cross-
licensed to each of the other patent owners. In another form, a third party 
administers one or more packages of patent licences to third party 
manufacturers (e.g. makers of generic antiretrovirals - ARVs). This patent 
package would be offered to third party licensees who would be authorised to 
use the bundle of patented inventions to exploit the technology encompassed 
by the patent pool. The third parties would typically pay royalties to the patent 
holders or to the organisation administering the pool. The organisation allocates 
royalties back to the patent owners. 
This form of collective patent management has been around for over 100 years 
in a variety of industries (Bekkers, Iversen and Blind 2006). Theoretical and 
practical reasons to create collective management structures include the 
possibility of lower prices, improved economies of scale, lower transaction costs 
of negotiating and administering licensing programmes, increased innovation, 
removing blocking patents and managing or eliminating litigation risks (Grassler 
and Capria 2003). 
                                            
6
 IFPMA Submission to the Public Hearing on Proposals for R&D Financing. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/phi/IFPMA.pdf. 
7
 Comments of Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) to the WHO public hearing for proposals 
for new and innovative sources of funding to stimulate R&D, 15 April 2009. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/phi/KEI.pdf.  
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Operationalising these collective management structures for ARVs is 
complicated by the fact that market-driven and public health-driven views of 
innovation and IP in the pharmaceutical value chain are often at odds. This 
factor is manifested as continued debate over patents and access to medicines. 
The OECD countries have technology buyers and sellers (Evenson, 2001) 
while, with some exceptions (South Africa, Brazil, India, China, Indonesia), 
developing countries are buyers of technology. 
Recent examples of patent pools have arisen in relation to UNITAID and GSK. 
On 2-3 July 2008, UNITAID's Executive Board approved a proposal to establish 
a patent pool for medicines with the aim of providing patients in low-income and 
middle-income countries with increased access to more appropriate and 
affordable medicines,8 with an initial focus on paediatric antiretroviral medicines 
and new combinations.9 Since then, on 13 February 2009, GSK announced its 
intention to create a least-developed country (LDC) patent pool to promote R&D 
into medicines for neglected diseases,10 contributing over 800 granted or 
pending GSK patents to the collaborative pool.11 However, the GSK 
announcement has been criticised as failing to provide a sustainable model for 
innovation and access for all12. It failed to include HIV in its definition of a 
neglected disease, apparently because GSK is separating middle-income 
developing countries from least-developed countries, offering a promise of 
benefits only to the least-developed, and little more.13 
  
                                            
8
 UNITAID Press Release: „UNITAID moves towards a patent pool for medicines‟. Available at: 
http://www.unitaid.eu/en/20080709113/News/UNITAID-moves-towards-a-patent-pool-for-
medicines.html. 
9
 This move was supported, in July 2009, by the UK All-Parliamentary Group on AIDS in its 
published report The Treatment Timebomb which called for patent pools for HIV drugs. 
10
 The diseases targeted by GSK‟s patent pool are the 16 diseases identified by the US Food 
and Drug Administration in its own neglected tropical diseases initiative. These are tuberculosis, 
malaria, blinding trachoma, buruli ulcer, cholera, dengue/dengue haemorrhagic fever, 
racunculiasis, fascioliasis, human African trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, leprosy, lymphatic 
filariasis, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, soil transmitted helminthiasis and yaws. 
11
 GSK’s contribution to the patent pool. Available at: 
http://www.gsk.com/collaborations/contribution.htm. 
12
 KEI reaction to GSK announcement on patent pool for neglected diseases. Available at: 
http://keionline.org/blogs/2009/02/19/gsk-patent-pool. 
13
 MSF Access to Medicines Campaign Press Release, 16 February 2009, A Welcome First 
Step - but HIV is also a neglected disease. Available at: http://www.msfaccess.org/media-
room/press-releases/press-release-
detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1532&cHash=f8c0eca3b4. 
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8 PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: USING PATENT 
INFORMATION TO STIMULATE INVENTION AND 
INNOVATION 
Although the evidence that patents encourage invention and innovation in 
developing and least-developed countries is ambiguous overall, one policy 
option available to developing and least-developed countries that could assist 
further with stimulating invention and innovation is greater use of patent 
information. Patent information comprises technical, legal, business-relevant 
and public policy-relevant information which is generally publicly available, free 
of charge. In this regard, Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement sets out the 
obligation to disclose a patented invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for others to be able to recreate the invention and improve upon it 
(UNCTAD-ICTSD 2005: 448). The expectation is that, while the inventor is 
given a limited monopoly on the use of his invention in exchange for allowing it 
to be published, others can build on it, even though they cannot use it during 
the term of patent protection without the patentee‟s agreement. As a result of 
this requirement, national and regional patent offices provide a vast repository 
of technical information that can be accessed free of charge. 
So there is great potential for patent information focusing on a particular 
technology – known as patent landscapes – to contribute to the development 
needs of developing countries by identifying essential technologies, know-how, 
processes and methods that are potentially of use to them.   
However, even though patent information is easily accessible via the internet, 
this resource is used to only a small fraction of its potential for stimulating 
invention and innovation. In building their economic success, Japanese firms 
used the publication provisions of the international patent system as a valuable 
source of information, even in pre-electronic information days, far more 
effectively than firms in any other country have done.14 The use of patent 
disclosure information remains limited in developing and least-developed 
countries, despite the existence of a number of free patent database services 
such as WIPO‟s Patentscope®15 or Cambia‟s Patent Lens.16 General knowledge 
and techniques in searching patent information, including the extraction of 
                                            
14
 Source: William Kingston, correspondence with the author. 
15
 http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/. 
16
 http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html. 
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relevant information from patent databases, are not at present readily known 
and therefore it is fundamentally important to support these through technical 
assistance initiatives in favour of developing and least-developed countries in 
the future. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has re-examined the premise that the absence of an effective 
patent system in developing and least-developed countries is important 
because unfettered imitation is a prerequisite for invention and innovation. The 
absence of patents, it is argued, is the essential first step to economic and 
technological development that allows firms in these countries to learn freely 
about, and to internalise, technological advancements in any given field before 
starting to invent and innovate themselves. 
For firms in developing or least-developed countries that are engaged in 
imitating or adapting technologies in this way, it is thought that introducing 
stronger patent protection could actually inhibit the process that helps them to 
learn about technologies and to build an effective knowledge base for 
subsequent R&D-orientated activity. According to this model, only when 
additional inventive capacity has been developed in this way will stronger patent 
systems stimulate innovation and invention in the manner anticipated in the 
developed world. 
However, recent successes in terms of building invention and innovation in 
China, India and other countries such as Brazil and Russia challenge the view 
that imitation should be considered a necessary phase of industrial 
development for emerging economies. These countries are building domestic 
infrastructure and R&D capacity by using other ways of learning about new 
technologies rather than relying on imitation. These new approaches include 
opportunity to access information available online, the use of open access 
scientific journals and patent databases. 
The fact that patent information in particular is not widely known or used in low-
income developing or least-developed countries in this way supports the view 
that it is fundamentally important to develop further technical assistance 
initiatives in favour of explaining how patents can stimulate and support 
invention and innovation in developing and least-developed countries in the 
future. 
In practice there can be no one-size-fits all approach to prescribing how patents 
can play a positive role in the global economy. The extent to which patents will 
contribute to invention, innovation and economic development will depend much 
on local conditions. Education, the structure and funding of R&D, the 
management of technological assets, and the existence of technology transfer 
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offices (TTOs) will all play a part, as will patent enforcement mechanisms. The 
extent to which patents can stimulate invention and innovation must also be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, and responsiveness to a patent system will 
vary depending on the industrial sectors and the countries concerned. 
The impact of pharmaceutical patents on health and access to medicines, 
where a number of alternative models for new drug development are now being 
articulated, is just one aspect of how the social value of invention and 
innovation needs to be balanced against the enclosures created by intellectual 
property rights (the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities being 
another notable example).  
Patents have the potential to stimulate invention and innovation, but they can 
also have unintended consequences and must be utilised as part of a wider set 
of policy instruments. The issue is consequently more complicated than simply 
saying whether or not patents will lead to development. The challenge for the 
future will be how best to incorporate these nuances into a complex web of 
policy imperatives that best define the role of patents in the global economy. 
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